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Abstract 
Commodity-based sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been at a crossroads following the 
recent fall in commodity prices. This paper provides a framework for commodity-based 
SWF management, focusing on stabilization and savings funds, by (i) examining macro-
fiscal linkages for SWFs; (ii) presenting an integrated  sovereign asset and liability 
management (SALM) approach to SWF management; and (iii) applying this framework to 
a scenario where assets are being accumulated and to a scenario where the SWF is drawn 
on to cover a financing gap due to lower commodity prices. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Commodity-based SWFs have experienced various strains since the pronounced fall in 
commodity prices over the past few years.2 Especially for countries where fiscal revenues are 
primarily dependent on certain commodity-export proceeds, the ongoing commodity price 
downturn has led their respective SWFs to become the last resort in financing part of their 
fiscal gaps. Compounding these challenges, returns on invested assets are expected to be 
lower than historical averages for quite some time. Thus, current challenges for resource-
based SWFs revolve primarily around maintaining their funding bases, and improving their 
investment activities in the prevailing environment of subdued growth and low interest rates. 
Other related challenges, involving SWF organizational and institutional structures, 
investment and risk management mandates as long-term investors, and transparency and 
accountability requirements as global investors, have also played a pivotal role in SWFs’ 
well-functioning and integration in the global financial system. 
SWFs are established with specific policy objectives, which largely determine their financial 
management, including investment and risk management decisions (Al-Hassan et al. 2013). 
According to the Santiago Principles (IWG 2008), SWFs are categorized as: (i) stabilization 
funds, set up to insulate the budget and economy from commodity price volatility and 
external shocks. Their investment horizons and liquidity objectives resemble central banks' 
reserve managers, in view of their role in countercyclical fiscal policies to smooth boom/bust 
cycles; (ii) savings funds, set up to share wealth across generations by transforming non-
renewable assets into diversified financial assets. Their investment mandates typically reflect 
a higher tolerance for volatility and a focus on long-term returns; (iii) development funds, set 
up to allocate resources to priority socioeconomic projects, usually infrastructure; (iv) 
pension reserve funds, set up to meet identified outflows in the future with respect to 
pension-related contingent-type liabilities on the government's balance sheet. They usually 
hold high shares in equities; and (v) reserve investment corporations, set up to reduce the 
negative carry costs of holding reserves or to earn higher return on ample reserves, while the 
assets in the funds are still counted as reserves. They often maintain high allocations in 
equities and alternative investments. The discussion in this paper focuses on stabilization and 
savings funds. 
The management of SWF assets has implications for the owner country’s macroeconomic 
and financial policies. For example, the stance of fiscal policy will be to some extent affected 
by changes in SWF inflow and outflow rules. While a well-designed SWF can help support 
the successful implementation of fiscal policy, it cannot serve as a substitute for a fiscal 
policy framework. In this connection, having an SWF does not in itself guarantee a sound 
and efficient fiscal policy framework. Further, optimal SWF management is closely linked to 
the broader issue of sovereign assets and liabilities management (SALM). In a period of low 
                                                 
2 The International Working Group of SWFs defined them as: “Special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements that are owned by the general government. Created by general government for macroeconomic 
purpose, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of 
investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets.”  
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commodity prices, SWFs are faced with critical decisions on asset accumulation/liquidation 
in the presence of sovereign debt and fiscal deficits.  
This paper sets out a simple framework of commodity-based SWF management, by 
analyzing asset accumulation and liquidation decisions in the broader context of the owner’s 
sovereign balance sheet. In particular, it (i) examines some relevant macro-fiscal linkages for 
SWFs, (ii) presents an integrated SALM approach to SWF management, and (iii) applies this 
framework to scenarios where assets are accumulated in an SWF and where the SWF is 
drawn on to cover a financing gap due to lower commodity prices. At times of persistent 
movements in commodity prices, there may be a need to align the management of the SWF 
to the fiscal framework through inflow and outflow rules for financing needs to be met. In 
this context, resilience of the sovereign balance sheet will be maximized if the management 
of sovereign assets and liabilities will be integrated and the liquidity risk on both the asset 
and liquidity sides of the sovereign balance sheet will be appropriately assessed.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses some important 
macroeconomic and financial linkages of SWF management. Section III sets out a general 
SALM framework, with particular emphasis on management of liquidity risk at the sovereign 
balance sheet level and its relevance to SWF strategy. Section IV presents an application of 
such a framework in the context of a growing SWF, while Section V addresses asset and debt 
management when lower commodity prices lead to a financing gap. Section VI provides 
some concluding remarks and policy considerations. 
II.   MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES 
Any fiscal framework ought to be guided by an assessment of fiscal sustainability and take 
appropriate account of external risk factors. Typically, a fiscal policy framework reflects 
country-specific factors that may change over time; promotes the sustainability of fiscal 
policy; is sufficiently flexible to enable scaling up growth-enhancing expenditure; considers 
absorption capacity constraints and the quality of public financial management systems; and 
provides adequate precautionary buffers to counter vulnerabilities to high volatility and 
uncertainty of resource revenue (see Baunsgaard et al., 2012). As a result, countries have 
adopted different inflow/outflow rules for their SWFs that are tailor made to reflect the 
appropriate fiscal policy strategies of each individual country (Appendix II).3 For example: 
• Chile: The country has a structural balance rule. To meet this rule, the authorities 
forecast the structural revenue where copper revenue is estimated using a long-term 
(10-year average), forward-looking reference price from an independent panel of 
experts; and other revenue is based on potential output that is estimated by a panel of 
experts. The expenditure is the residual, after subtracting the structural balance target 
from the estimated structural revenue. 
                                                 
3 Others do not have formal rules (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE). 
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• Norway: According to the so-called “spending rule” (first established in 2001), the non-
oil budget deficit should be on average 3 percent of the Norwegian SWF over time, 
which corresponds to the estimated real return on the fund.4 
• Russia: A special mechanism was developed for the use of oil and gas revenues within 
the federal budget with a view to reducing the budget’s dependence on oil and gas 
revenues, as well as to accumulating reserves in the event when oil prices retreat. These 
revenues are accumulated in the Reserve and the National Wealth Funds. After the 
2009 crisis and until January 2015, the mechanism for oil and gas revenues was 
suspended and funds were used directly to finance the budget deficit.  
• Timor-Leste: The Petroleum Fund’s only expenditure is a transfer to the budget, 
payment of operational management fees, and refunds of overpaid taxation. The 
mechanism for integrating the Petroleum Fund and the budget is the estimated 
sustainable income, calculated as 3 percent of total petroleum wealth (estimated as the 
sum of the value of the Petroleum Fund and remaining oil resources). The transfer to 
the budget requires an explicit decision of Parliament. 
In addition, the appropriate rules for inflows and outflows should be seen in the context of 
necessary general improvements to the fiscal framework. The framework needs to explicitly 
take into account off-budget spending and government-guaranteed debt. Ideally, a fiscal 
framework would target a sustainable longer-term trajectory for the non-commodity budget 
deficit. Changes in this deficit is an important indicator of the fiscal stance, so a commitment 
to a smooth and sustainable trajectory for it would imply significantly reduced risk of pro-
cyclical and unsustainable fiscal policy in the future. In such a setup, the inflow and outflow 
rules for an SWF would reflect the accumulation of assets associated with the chosen long-
term trajectory of non-resource deficits and act as a buffer for changing commodity 
revenues.5 
The inflow and outflow rules for an SWF should be aligned closely with the actual net fiscal 
position of the government (IMF, 2015). It is critical to establish a firm link between asset 
accumulation/liquidation in SWFs and changes in actual balances in the form of budget 
surpluses/deficits.6 Such rules would ensure that the accumulation/liquidation of assets in 
SWFs reflects changes in the actual financial position of the sovereign balance sheet. This 
approach seems even more urgent for countries with an increasing stock of debt and a high 
cost of servicing it. While building up a portfolio of liquid assets provides some benefits in 
                                                 
4 This is similar to U.S. endowment funds that often have spending rules based loosely on 4–5 percent of a  
5-year moving average of fund value. The Norwegian government recently changed the rule by lowering the 
non-oil budget deficit from 4 to 3 percent of the fund, reflecting lower expected returns. 
5 So rather than targeting a specific size of the SWF or a specific share of commodity revenues to flow to the 
fund and treating the resulting room for fiscal spending as a residual, one would target the long-term trajectory 
for spending of commodity revenues through the financing of the non-resource deficit, and let accumulation in 
the SWF follow from that.  
6 Appendix I provides an overview of SWF asset accumulation and revenue projection models.  
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the form of lower risk of financing constraints in tight global liquidity conditions, the 
opportunity cost of holding such assets is high in the current financial environment.  
When a fund is set up to manage revenue from exports of natural resources, it is essential that 
its assets be largely invested abroad for the fund to meet its stated objectives. Investing the 
fund’s assets domestically will have a procyclical bias and not be compatible with 
the stabilization objective of the fund. Upward swings in commodity prices tend to result in a 
boom in aggregate domestic demand, inflationary pressures, and thus an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate vis-à-vis trading partners in resource-based economies. Investing the fund 
outside the domestic economy would help mitigate that risk. For a resource-based fund, 
investing assets in the domestic economy implies that more money will be flowing into 
domestic assets when resource revenues are high, pushing up asset prices. Conversely, assets 
may have to be withdrawn from the fund to support the budget if resource revenues fall. In 
this case, sale of assets from the fund will contribute to lowering prices of domestic assets 
exactly at a time when they will already tend to be depressed due to external factors. Further, 
in the case of fund purchases of domestic government debt instruments, the fund would 
essentially be functioning as an extension of the fiscal budget and create an unwanted 
loophole in the fiscal framework. 
Even when a fund is invested abroad, there may be unintended elements of procyclicality 
stemming from the design of fiscal rules. When the fiscal rule is linked to the size of a fund, 
cyclical swings in asset prices can translate into cyclicality in spending.7 For countries with 
spending rules based fully or partly on estimates of future prices of resources (e.g., Chile, 
Timor-Leste), projections of future prices may also be influenced by the current price 
environment, which may introduce an element of procyclicality in spending. In addition to 
the government-budget linkages, other links between the investment strategies of 
commodity-based SWFs and the macroeconomic framework of the owner country relate to 
monetary policy and exchange rate movements (see Brown et al., 2010).    
III.   SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND STRATEGY AND SOVEREIGN ASSET AND LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT 
The SALM approach, as analyzed by Das et al. (2012), represents an analytical framework 
for asset and liability management policies based on the sovereign balance sheet. The main 
objective of sovereign liability management is to ensure financing of the budget at the lowest 
possible cost subject to an acceptable level of risk over the medium to long term. In contrast, 
the objectives of the sovereign asset management are to ensure that cash balances meet 
commitments and maximize the purchasing power of any long-term capital given an 
acceptable level of risk. The SALM approach aims at a holistic approach to these issues, by 
assessing both sustainability and vulnerability of government finances in the face of potential 
shocks. 
                                                 
7 The Norwegian spending rule is deliberately set as a medium-term guideline for the non-oil budget deficit 
rather than a strict rule to be followed every year. This avoids a direct link between variable asset prices and 
government spending. 
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A sovereign balance sheet should be based on economic rather than fixed accounting 
principles (Merton, 2007), considering the underlying intertemporal objective of the 
sovereign and including future income and expenditures (Table 1).8 This, of course, does not 
preclude audits of the SWF balance sheet or assessments of the SWF performance in 
accordance with recognized international or national standards. 
 
Table 1. Stylized Sovereign Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
  
Present Value of Incomes: 
  Taxes 
  Fees 
  Seigniorage 
 
Present Value of Nondiscretionary Expenses: 
  Social and economic development 
  Government administration 
Balances: 
  Cash 
  Currency Reserves 
  Investments (pension funds and SWFs) 
 
  Government-owned enterprises 
  Infrastructure 
  Real Estate 
  Other assets 
Balances: 
  Monetary base 
  Government debt 
    In domestic currency 
    In foreign currency 
  Pension Liabilities 
 
 Contingent claims (explicit and implicit) 
  Guarantees to banks and nonbanks 
  Guarantees on retirement income 
  Guarantees on social welfare 
 Net worth 
Net financial worth 
  Source: Merton (2007).  
 
There are, however, challenges in defining the sovereign balance sheet. The first relates to 
the choice of relevant accounting practices, where the value of assets and liabilities depends 
much on which accounting measure is used: mark-to-market valuation or historical price. For 
example, large movement in interest rates and exchange rates will have significant impact on 
bond valuation and external debt if marked-to-market. The second challenge is to determine 
the items of assets and liabilities that should be included in the SALM.  
A narrow definition of the SALM, used in many developing and emerging market 
economies, includes coordination between international reserves and foreign currency debt. 
Broader definitions include all sovereign financial assets and liabilities, with the present 
value of nonfinancial assets excluded given the difficulty in measuring them. In this paper, 
the focus will be on financial assets. 
                                                 
8 The IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manuals is an accounting approaching for the valuation of 
government’s assets and liabilities. 
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The accumulation and drawdowns of assets in an SWF and its investment strategy ought to 
be seen in the broader context of SALM. One aspect thereof for indebted resource-rich 
countries is striking the right balance between debt repayments and the building up of SWF 
assets. On the one hand, liquid assets in an SWF can give more flexibility in the 
implementation of fiscal policies and make it easier to absorb short-term fluctuations in 
resource revenues within an appropriate long-term framework.9 On the other hand, the cost of 
servicing debt would usually be higher than expected returns on a low-risk portfolio of assets 
in a fund set up to meet stabilization objectives. Holding liquid reserves in a fund would thus 
imply an opportunity cost (carry cost) for the government. In addition, while the costs 
associated with government liabilities are near certain (i.e. based largely upon the issuance-
weighted coupon on current debt outstanding), there is a wide range of possible return 
outcomes for prospective investments over different time horizons.  
Reducing the stock of government debt may also reduce the risk premium on government 
bonds, which all else equal, should help to ease financial conditions and thus support 
economic growth. Recent research suggests that the net, and not the gross, debt level is the 
main determinant of the government’s financing cost (Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2016) and 
Bianchi et al. (2016)).10 The implication is that countries cannot reduce the risk premium by 
drawing on liquid assets to repay debt, since this deleveraging of the sovereign balance sheet 
does not change the net asset position of the government. However, in a more dynamic 
framework, reduced opportunity cost of holding liquid assets could translate into lower 
spreads over time as the benefits of a more optimal SALM feeds into fiscal balances and thus 
into the trajectory of net debt. 
A Unified Approach to Liquidity Risk Management 
In practice, one of the most significant risk factors for the sovereign balance sheet is the risk 
of sudden shortages of liquidity in international financial markets. While the sovereign 
balance sheet may be healthy from a solvency perspective, many of the most valuable 
assets—for instance the net present value of future tax receipts—will be illiquid. At the same 
time, there may be a significant exposure to adverse international liquidity events on the 
liability side of the sovereign balance sheet; a foreign high debt burden with short maturity 
will increase the risk of having to roll over debt in periods of constrained liquidity. A large 
banking sector dependent on access to external funding may be vulnerable if global liquidity 
dries up and represent a significant contingent liability for the sovereign balance sheet.  
From an asset allocation perspective, risk factors, including liquidity, credit, or the equity 
premium, can be seen as the building blocks of expected returns. Some risk factors, such as 
                                                 
9 The value of this option is obviously higher when the resource sector is a dominant part of the overall 
economy. 
10 For example, in the case of a commodity-producing country with a SWF, net debt will be lower due to the 
accumulation of assets. This results in lower bond risk premia and, in turn, lower coupons.  
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liquidity, may have particularly skewed return distributions.11 Exposure to these factors will 
generally give investors modest, positive returns in most years, but a few, shorter periods of 
significant losses—and these losses would often occur just when investors can least tolerate 
them.12 The pay-off structure for exposure to such factors is similar to the pay-off investors 
would receive if they sold insurance against the events that trigger losses connected to 
exposure to them.  
By definition, the average investor must hold the market-weighted average of all available 
assets in the financial markets. Any investor who holds more than his or her “fair” share of 
exposure to systematic risk factors would therefore in most years earn higher returns than the 
average market return. However, s/he will have significant losses compared to the average 
investor in periods when there is a credit or liquidity event or some other event that triggers a 
drawdown in value connected to exposure to factors with skewed return distributions.  
We can then restate the investment problem in an insurance framework. The issue of 
choosing whether to take more or less risk than the risk in the market portfolio can be 
equivalently formulated as a question of whether one would want to buy or sell insurance 
against, for instance, a credit or liquidity event. Those who are selling insurance would 
expect higher returns over time, but would have to cope with periods of potentially 
significant losses. The buyers of insurance would have to live with below-average returns 
over time, but would be protected against large losses in “bad” years.  
This can be a useful starting point for a discussion of the capacity to take liquidity risk on the 
asset side of the sovereign balance sheet, for instance, in currency reserves, government 
pension funds, or sovereign wealth funds. It can also be a useful perspective on risk on the 
liability side of the sovereign balance sheet. For instance, borrowing with long duration may 
imply a higher expected cost of financing due to positive term premium, but also lower risk 
of having to roll over debt under tight liquidity conditions. In general, lower liquidity risk 
comes at a cost of lower expected returns on assets and/or higher costs of servicing liabilities. 
An optimal level of insurance against this risk requires both an understanding of the nature of 
this risk and an understanding of the costs of taking out insurance against it (see also Bianchi 
et al., 2016). In general, the liabilities of the sovereign balance sheet will be more exposed to 
liquidity risk in circumstances such as: 
• The government debt/GDP ratio is high 
• The share of illiquid assets to total assets is high 
• The average maturity of government debt is low and/or the investor base is 
concentrated 
• The government cannot borrow in its own currency and/or cannot create liquidity in the 
currency it borrows in 
                                                 
11 More precisely, they tend to be negatively skewed, leptokurtic and co-vary with the price of risk.  
12 In general, investors’ risk-return profiles differ depending on different factors, including liquidity needs and 
the investment horizon. These profiles shape the investment policy, with the investment horizon determining the 
impact of investors’ exposures to liquidity risks. In this context, a SWF with a long-term investment horizon 
could sell insurance against liquidity risks to cover associated exposures.  
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• The assets of the banking sector are large relative to GDP 
• The banks are thinly capitalized and have low reserves of liquidity 
• The banks rely on funding in foreign markets 
• The private sector has a high level of external short term debt 
• The depth and liquidity of the domestic currency and bond market is low 
 
On the other hand, risks will be mitigated if the government has ample access to liquidity 
through, for instance, high international reserves of liquid assets. One can thus usefully 
distinguish between four different combinations of access to liquid assets and liquidity 
exposure of liabilities as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
For the different combinations of liquidity exposure and liquidity access, the following 
general policy implications may be drawn: 
 
I. Monitor liquidity risk. While low exposure to liquidity risk gives little risk of 
adverse shocks in the short term, low access to liquid reserves makes it important to 
monitor risk and take measure to mitigate it if it increases. This could happen, for 
instance, if there is a strong growth in the domestic banking sector or budget 
deficits financed by short-term borrowing.  
II. Reduce liquidity risk. The combination of low liquid reserves and high 
vulnerability on the liability side of the balance sheet calls makes liquidity risk 
reduction an urgent priority. Relevant measures could include extending the 
maturity profile of government borrowing, taking steps to curb lending growth in 
the banking sector and increasing its capital adequacy, taking steps to increase 
official reserves and to increase liquidity of existing reserves. This can be thought 
of as moving from II to I in the diagram. 
III. Consider the liquidity risk capacity of reserves. A typical example of a country 
in this group would be a resource rich economy with a relatively large SWF, and 
with low gross debt and/or a robust banking sector. Such countries may consider 
enhancing expected returns of their assets by shifting into less liquid assets. One 
example of this is how Norway is gradually moving into less liquid assets in the 
Government Pension Fund through for instance real estate investments, thus 
moving from III to I in the diagram. 
IV. Consider deleveraging the sovereign balance sheet. While the availability of 
liquid assets makes adverse liquidity-related shocks less likely in the short term, 
there may be a significant cost of carry in holding liquid assets to match the 
liquidity risk on the liability side. Using excess reserves to repay external debt is 
one way of reducing this cost. Mexico, for instance, used excess currency reserves 
to repay government debt through an arrangement between the Central Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance in the 1990s, moving from IV to I. 
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Figure 1. Combinations of Liquidity Access and Liquidity Exposure 
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IV.   ASSET AND DEBT MANAGEMENT WITH A GROWING SWF 
Applications of SALM 
A practical application of the SALM considerations in the case of indebted commodity 
exporters with growing commodity revenues would suggest a three-stage approach 
(Figure 2):13  
• The key priorities during stage one and two are to allow for debt reduction as set out in 
the fiscal framework and building up a fund to act as a stabilizer to cushion the budget 
and the economy against volatile commodity prices. It is critical to strike the right 
balance between debt repayments and asset accumulation for stabilization purpose.14 
Therefore, the appropriate level of the stabilization fund should be evaluated in a SALM 
framework, taking account of interest rate levels and the size of public debt. The pros and 
cons of various targets for asset accumulation should be carefully evaluated as part of the 
overall fiscal framework. 
                                                 
13 The establishment of a SWF presupposes that that the SWF owner country has (i) adequate international 
reserves and (ii) not excessive debt. These considerations are critical for the country's financial stability and 
should be satisfied before it proceeds with the establishment of for example a savings fund. In this context, we 
propose the three-fold "tranching" of the SWF's resources. It should be noted that this is not a symmetric 
process when the fund has to liquidate its assets to finance budget deficits. Also, the approach will depend on 
the magnitude of the commodity price fall, fiscal shortfalls, and availability of financial buffers. 
14 It may not be optimal to reduce gross government debt to zero, for example, because having a stock of debt 
outstanding helps keep the market alive (and thus facilitate government liquidity management) and develop 
capital markets. Further, a country’s Debt Sustainability Analysis will determine its suitable level of debt under 
plausible assumptions on its key fiscal and macroeconomic variables that drive debt dynamics. 
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i. Stabilization: to allow the SWF to play a role as a stabilization fund by letting 
automatic stabilizers work through the economic cycle. 15  
ii. Debt reduction: the priority should be to use annual “commodity revenues” to reduce 
the stock of government foreign debt to sustainable levels.16 The exact target for debt 
reduction would have to be set as part of an overall fiscal policy strategy. The SWF 
would still contribute to stabilizing the economy and insulating it from the effects of 
commodity price volatility in two ways: (i) the use of annual commodity revenues for 
debt reduction in itself implies that commodity revenue volatility will be absorbed by 
changes in the rate of debt reduction rather than in changes in government spending; 
(ii) to allow for letting automatic budget stabilizers work within an appropriate long-
term fiscal policy framework, and letting the resulting changes in the budget stance be 
absorbed by the SWF.  
• The third stage would start once the target debt level and optimal size of the stabilization 
objective were reached. At that point, the focus should be turned to long-term savings 
objectives.  
Figure 2. A Stylized Illustration of the Accumulation of Resources in the SWF  
 
 
As part of the work on drawing up the fiscal strategy and SALM framework that will guide 
the milestones for the three-stage approach, a “financing fund” model can be considered for 
the SWF (Box 1 and 2). In this model, transfers from the fund would cover non-commodity 
deficits. The actual outflows would then be contingent on the trajectory of non-commodity 
deficits, which in turn should be determined by an appropriate long-term fiscal policy 
                                                 
15 The term ”automatic stabilizers” refers to the dampening effect on volatility in the economy from changes in 
taxes, transfers, etc., through the business cycle. They will manifest themselves through larger variations in 
actual budget deficits than in structural budget deficits over time, where the ”structural” part of the deficit is 
the deficit one would have when the economy is operating at normal capacity. 
16 The level of debt should be guided by a debt sustainability analysis.  
•Debt reduction
Stage I
•Debt reduction
•Building up a 
stabilization fund
Stage II
•Targeting long-
term saving 
objectives
Stage III
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strategy. The appropriate fiscal rule would be contingent on several factors, including the 
size of the non-commodity deficit at the time of transition to a financing fund model. For the 
first stage, where the focus is on debt reduction, fiscal targets must be coordinated with 
appropriate debt-reduction targets. 
The effects of asset accumulation on debt servicing costs should also be considered. As 
reserves and other pools of sovereign assets grow, the resilience of the economy in the event 
of adverse shocks increases. This may have a positive effect on credit ratings and the costs of 
servicing debt, making the “insurance premium” for building financial assets lower. For 
instance, in August 2012 Moody’s indicated the possibility of upgrading the sovereign rating 
of Angola on the basis of reduced vulnerability to shocks after the establishment of a fiscal 
stabilization fund to cushion the impact of external shocks on the government finances.  
The investment strategy of SWF assets should be reconsidered in a macro-fiscal framework. 
If some SWF assets are invested in the domestic financial system, it may contribute to 
procyclical macro-policies, as the fund will have a tendency to acquire domestic currency-
denominated assets when there is a commodity boom and disposing of them when 
commodity prices fall. Deposit of SWF funds in domestic commercial banks risks amplifying 
these effects through effects on these banks’ balance sheets and lending capacity. Any plan to 
shift SWF assets to international financial markets should recognize that this shift may have 
shorter-term consequences for financial stability and the exchange rate. Finally, there needs 
to be close coordination among the institutions involved in the management of sovereign 
assets and liabilities. This is typically achieved through appropriate legislation that 
establishes policy guidelines (to avoid substantial mismatches) and the sharing of 
information. 
Investment and Risk Management under the Three-stage Approach17 
 
Determining the investment and risk management framework for a SWF has to begin with 
the purpose or objective of the SWF. The three-stage approach essentially puts a ring around 
funds that are serving different purposes: repaying debt, smoothing fiscal revenues, and 
building a portfolio of assets as part of a long-term savings strategy.18 While the financing 
model we have discussed will allow two or even three of these purposes to exist within a 
single SWF, the clarity and calibration of the tranches is key to establishing an appropriate 
investment strategy overall.19 
  
For the debt repayment tranche, the funds will be applied directly to retiring the debt in most 
instances. Where there are delays in being able to repay the debt, the objective of any pool of 
                                                 
17 Appendix III provides further considerations on investment and risk management. 
18 IMF (2012) and IMF (2014a) provide a fuller discussion of how to derive an optimal strategy for asset 
accumulation in the context of resource rich economies. 
19 Of course, there could be a more formal separation of the investment tranches into separate funds, and in 
principle different managers for the different funds (for instance the Central Bank for the most liquid fund and a 
separate manager for longer term savings). But this will not affect the general principles outlined here. 
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assets will be to match the domicile, currency, duration and credit of the liability, i.e. the debt 
that it is intended to repay. The investment management framework for this tranche will 
focus on the appropriate level of mismatch, given the available investments. 
  
For the stabilization tranche, the objective could be stated as “maximize returns while 
ensuring sufficient funds are available to smooth fiscal revenues during foreseeable 
downturns.” The focus here will be on liquidity risk management and the definition of 
“foreseeable.” If the pool is well funded relative to fiscal revenues, then a greater degree of 
risk could be borne and higher returns anticipated. If stakeholders need “foreseeable” to 
mean “any” downturn then less risk can be taken, and less return can be anticipated. In all 
instances, the favored assets will be foreign investments with good liquidity and a tendency 
to go up in price, or at least not do go down, during the sorts of crises that would lead to 
fiscal deficits. These characteristics favor foreign fixed interest assets although a business 
case might be made for other foreign assets that have prices that are lowly correlated with 
crises. The investment management frameworks would focus on the assets that are approved 
for investment, credit and currency management, and the likelihood of sufficient liquidity to 
meet foreseeable fiscal shortfalls, which would include modeling of price movements during 
stress tests. 
  
For the long-term savings tranche, a reasonable objective is to “maximize long-term returns 
subject to not incurring undue risk.” Where the stabilization tranche is considered effective 
and the likelihood of needing to draw on the savings tranche is remote, higher risk and less 
liquid investments such as equities and private assets can be added, with the anticipation of a 
commensurately higher return. These higher-return investments are compatible with an 
objective to maximize long-term returns, and the key discussion for the stakeholders is to 
agree what level of risk would be considered “undue.” The investment management 
frameworks would focus on how to size the allocations of capital to the different types of 
investment in order to maximize return for a given level of risk (often referred to as asset 
allocation), which in turn requires a clear set of investment beliefs held by the stakeholders. 
Frameworks for appointing aligned managers, currency management and liquidity 
management are also investment management priorities. 
  
Risk appetite discussions amongst the stakeholders around the definition of “foreseeable” 
and “undue” are essential, as is transparency and communication. In the current low-yield 
environment, focusing on costs has never been more important. The costs of unwinding one 
investment to establish another, after a change of heart or other knee-jerk reaction, is likely to 
be one of the most expensive avoidable costs; to avoid this cost, trust and transparency must 
be established. 
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Box 1. Saving and Investment Decision in the Context of Natural Resource Wealth 
A nation can save either in financial assets (by accumulating claims on other countries) or in domestic assets 
that increase consumption possibilities in the future. These domestic assets could be either physical assets, 
such as infrastructure, or increased human capital in the form of better health care or education. When a 
country transforms wealth in the form of natural resources into savings for future generations, it is thus, in 
principle, faced with a choice between accumulating financial assets and/or accumulating other forms of 
wealth.  
In general, many poorer, resource-rich countries have been constrained in their access to credit, so many 
profitable investments in, for example, education, healthcare, or infrastructure have not been undertaken. 
When income and consumption are already at low levels, reducing consumption to finance investments to 
foster growth is often not an option. In this way, a combination of constrained credit and low income can 
lead to a poverty trap.  
In principle, increased revenues from natural resources can be a way of breaking out of this trap by 
channeling some of the extra revenues into domestic investments to promote growth. To the extent that such 
investments have been constrained in the past, these domestic investment opportunities will often yield 
higher returns than alternative investments in foreign financial assets. However, there are several factors that 
will constrain the optimal level of such domestic investments:  
First, it should be noted that—by definition—one dollar of increased exports from the resource sector in a 
country has to be matched by a combination of  
• Reduced exports from other sectors of the economy (x); and/or  
• Increased imports (y); and/or  
• Increased claims on other countries in the form of an accumulation of financial assets (z), 
where x+y+z=1. 
Thus, if the government decides not to accumulate assets in a fund (z=0), the result must be either increased 
net imports or increased net accumulation of financial assets by the private sector. These effects will be 
brought about by changes in prices, wages, and equilibrium exchange and interest rates. Increased net 
imports will have to come about through real exchange rate appreciation which will have to be reversed 
when resource income falls, leading to risk of Dutch disease problems. Accumulation of financial assets in a 
fund helps reduce this risk.  
Second, it should be noted that even if many domestic investments may seem profitable on an individual 
basis, the sum of all projects might be considerably less profitable. This is because of the effect of the 
investments on equilibrium prices, wages, and exchange and interest rates as described above.  
Third, while projects may be profitable for society as a whole, they may erode government finances over 
time. This is because the costs of these investments typically are borne by the government, while the benefits 
accrue to the private sector. If mechanisms for sharing the returns from such investments with the 
government in the form of taxes and user tariffs are weak, the optimal level of such investments may be 
lower. All of these issues should be addressed in a unified framework that assesses optimal domestic 
investment levels within a broader macroeconomic context, including longer-term growth and fiscal 
sustainability issues.  
 
Source: IMF (2014a). 
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Box 2. Financing Funds 
Stabilization funds are generally set up to reduce the impact of volatile revenues, such as Chile (Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund) and Russia (Oil Stabilization Fund). Typically, the inflows and outflows are 
contingent on whether revenues are “high/low.”  
 
The primary objective of savings funds is to build wealth for future generations, such as Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority, Libya, Norway, and Russia (National Welfare Fund). These funds typically have fixed 
inflows and discretionary outflows, and are set up when a government can set aside funds for the future and 
be reasonably confident that it will not be necessary to liquidate the assets in the fund in the short and 
medium run.  
 
A financing fund model is an SWF that combines the characteristics of a savings fund and a stabilization 
fund, such as Norway and Timor-Leste. It is a model that is fully integrated with the government budget 
process. Typically, the inflows to the fund will be the resource revenues of the government in addition to the 
returns on the fund’s investments. The outflow from the fund will be a transfer to cover the non-resource 
budget deficit (that is, the deficit that arises when the resource revenues of the government are excluded). 
 
In this way, the fund will receive positive net transfers if, and only if, there is a government budget surplus 
when resource revenues are included. This implies that the accumulation of assets in the fund will correspond 
to an improvement in the government’s net asset position. For stabilization funds and savings funds, this is 
not necessarily the case (for example, New Zealand), since they are not linked to the budget 
deficits/surpluses of the government. 
 
A central feature of this model is the fiscal policy guideline (rule). This guideline sets out the desired 
trajectory of the non-resource budget deficit to be covered by transfers from the fund.  
 
 
 
 
V.   ASSET AND DEBT MANAGEMENT WITH A FINANCING GAP 
The plunge in commodity prices since mid-2014 (especially for oil) has had considerable 
impact on the size and rate of accumulation of sovereign assets, and has created fiscal 
shortfalls in many oil-producing countries. In attempting to close financing gaps (fiscal 
deficits plus servicing of debt), commodity-exporting countries have utilized a mix of asset 
drawdowns and debt issuance. Sharing the burden between the fiscal adjustment and 
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drawdown of SWF will depend on the cyclical and permanent nature of price decline and 
duration of fiscal adjustment. 
Many governments initially drew on their deposits in the domestic banking system and 
liquidated assets in SWFs and/or international reserves, as drawing on liquid financial assets 
is the fastest and easiest way of bridging financing gaps during the early stages of shocks, 
especially when a government has not been issuing any debt prior to the commodity shock. 
Subsequently, after being absent for many years, they borrowed from domestic banks and 
tapped international debt markets, as shrinking commodity revenues eroded their budgets. In 
some cases, syndicated loans from international lenders have been utilized (Figure 3).  
In general, the choices between borrowing and drawing down financial assets will depend on 
borrowing costs, market access and sentiment, the objectives and size of SWFs, liquidity of 
financial assets, and risk management trade-offs for the whole sovereign balance sheet.20 For 
example, Saudi Arabia faced the sharp decline in the oil prices during 2014–2016 from a 
strong asset-liability position, it has utilized a number of options for financing—reducing its 
deposits with the central bank, and borrowing domestically and internationally (Box 3). Each 
of these has its own costs and benefits, which are likely to vary depending on market 
circumstances. Similarly, there has been a gradual increase in the non-oil deficit in recent 
years, exacerbated by weaker growth in the wake of lower oil prices. 
Figure 3. Linkages between Closing Financing Gap and Sovereign Asset 
 
 
While stabilization funds may not provide full protection for the falling oil prices after 2014, 
this does not necessarily mean that the stabilization funds were too small. As discussed in 
Section III above, there is a high cost to insure for such a large shock. The relative size of the 
stabilization and savings portions of a financing fund should be calibrated to take account of 
this.  
 
                                                 
20 IMF (2016) provides detailed examples on financing fiscal deficits.  
Phase IIPhase I
Closing financing gap
Withdrawing 
deposits from the 
banking system
Domestic borrowing
Liquidating sovereign 
assets
External borrowing 
(bonds, syndicated 
loans)
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A shock of the magnitude experienced after 2014 has in many cases led to very different 
perspectives for the accumulation of financial assets in a savings fund. This may warrant 
revisiting the stated objectives for the savings fund, and the agreed risk appetite and 
investment beliefs, as they are now generally applied to a smaller fund with—possibly—a 
shorter remaining investment horizon.  
 
Box 3. The Role of SWFs in Closing Financing Gaps 
Saudi Arabia has faced the recent collapse in oil prices from a strong sovereign balance sheet. Government 
debt was less than 2 percent of GDP and its deposits at SAMA (considered as a SWF) stood at around 50 
percent of GDP as of end-June 2014.21 Due to the collapse of international oil prices, the country incurred 
fiscal deficits after accumulating fiscal surpluses for several years. The fiscal deficit reached 16 and 17 
percent of GDP as of end-2015 and 2016, respectively. 
Though the government has been accustomed to managing large sovereign assets, with the bulk of assets 
managed by SAMA, the increasing issuance of debt to finance fiscal deficits has posed a challenge to 
manage the sovereign balance sheet 
(e.g., minimizing interest rate and exchange 
rate risks). Therefore, to limit the pressures on 
drawing down financial assets, the government 
has been optimizing its asset-liability 
management to close financing gaps through a 
mixture of using assets and/or issuing debt. 
Fiscal deficits have been financed though 
drawdown of government deposits at SAMA, 
domestic borrowing from the banking system 
and institutional investors, and external 
borrowing (both through syndicated loans and 
Eurobonds). 
In Norway, there has been a gradual increase in 
the structural non-oil deficit in recent years, 
exacerbated by weaker growth in the wake of 
lower oil prices. However, a growing SWF has 
at the same time implied a gradual increase in 
the structural level of cash returns from 
financial assets (dividends, interest coupons, 
and rental income from properties—excluding 
any revaluations). This has broadly offset the 
effect of a widening non-oil deficit. 
 
 
  
                                                 
21 It covers central government gross debt, deposits and reserves at SAMA. It does not cover other central 
government assets, e.g., the Public Investment Fund, another SWF, government’s stakes in some companies. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION  
As commodity prices may stay low for longer, it is critical for the SWF owner country to 
assess the relationship between bridging financing gaps and asset accumulation/liquidation of 
SWFs within a broad SALM framework. In this context, there is a need to align the 
management of the SWF to the fiscal framework through inflow and outflow rules, the 
balance between debt repayment and asset accumulation, and appropriate investment 
strategies that can meet fiscal financing needs on a timely basis.  
While many resource-based economies faced the recent decline in commodity prices from a 
position of financial strength, it is essential for those economies without an asset-liability 
framework to develop such a framework, especially in view of potential financing needs over 
the short to medium-term. Accordingly, it will be highly desirable to integrate the 
management of sovereign assets and liabilities in a manner that maximizes the resilience of 
the sovereign balance sheet. In this context, appropriate assessments of liquidity risk on both 
the asset and liability sides of the sovereign balance sheet will play a central part. 
Clear and consistent objectives, risk appetite and investment beliefs for each pool of 
sovereign wealth are key for ensuring consistency and transparency in investment decisions 
and the overall functioning of SWFs. Where assets from long-term savings have been used 
for stabilization, the allocation of the remaining portfolio may need to be reevaluated to 
ensure continued consistency with long term objectives. 
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Appendix I. SWF Asset Accumulation and Revenue Projection Models 
 
Among the challenges faced by resource-rich countries is the high uncertainty of commodity 
prices and their impact on resource revenue. Forecasts of future income from natural 
resources are a central part of the budget process and macroeconomic modeling in most 
resource-rich countries. In general, the commodity sector is treated as an exogenous source 
of income, both for the economy as a whole and for the government (in the form of royalties, 
taxes, and dividends). That is the case, for example, in New Zealand, Norway, Alaska, and 
Chile. For countries with SWFs where flows are linked to exports of commodities, these 
forecasts feed into projections of asset growth. This can in turn inform decisions on 
investment strategy.22 
In order to make the assumptions that feed such models, most countries use a plethora of 
sources. In general, forecasts on quantities are obtained from the main companies in the 
sector and consider the production plans of both operating projects and projects under 
construction. Information is also provided by specialized institutions, such as the relevant 
ministries, the tax revenue service, and producers associations. In the case of Chile, for 
instance, both the central bank and the MoF collect information from the main companies, 
the Ministry of Mining, and the tax revenue service. In the case of Norway, the starting point 
for the analysis is a forecast of expected future petroleum production on the Norwegian 
continental shelf provided by Norwegian Petroleum (a public agency) and available on its 
website. 
Information on expected quantities provided by companies is in many cases treated as a “best 
case scenario.” An adjustment is done to account for underperformance bias, based on 
historical information. For Chile, between 2004–14, future production was overestimated on 
average by 20 percent.23 Four causes for the overestimation for mines in operation were 
dominant: (1) overestimation of average mineral proportion per ton of cinder (this is a small 
source of bias, because companies use models that can determine this variable with 
accuracy); (2) unpredictable natural events such as landslides, earthquakes, and rock 
explosions; (3) accidents with life casualties that force mines to cease operations temporarily; 
and (4) equipment failure. In addition, there are regular delays in the construction of new 
mines.  
With respect to price forecasts, there is a distinction between the short and the long run. A 
combination of external and internal forecasts is used to project prices in the short run. For 
the long run, the common assumption is that prices in U.S. dollars increase at a rate that is 
similar to global inflation. In other words, the real dollar prices of commodities are projected 
                                                 
22 Equities were introduced in the Norwegian SWF in 1998 based on projections of strong future growth in 
assets, although actual assets at the time were limited. 
23 See Lagos (2014). 
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to remain constant. This forecast implicitly assumes that the real price follows a random walk 
without drift. This is the practice at the World Bank and the IMF.  
For countries that calculate structural prices for their main commodity exports, the 
calculation is usually forward looking. In Chile, the SWFs accumulate assets according to a 
rule that is based on a “structural surplus.”24 In order to calculate the structural revenues, the 
government uses, among other variables, a structural price for copper, which is an important 
export. For the calculation, once a year the government asks a committee of experts to 
provide their forecast for the average price of copper for the next 10 years. The structural 
price is the simple average of each expert’s forecast (excluding the highest and the lowest 
estimate). In Timor-Leste, forward-looking estimates of prices are used to calculate a net 
present value of petroleum resources, which in turn feeds into the fiscal framework through a 
spending rule linked to sustainable income. 
It is worth noting that technological and other structural risks affect various aspects of the 
policy challenge. First, the total amount of extractable natural resources depends on evolving 
extraction technology (e.g., the technology of oil sands extraction and renewables is 
advancing quickly). Second, the cost of extraction may fall over time due to technological 
progress. Third, earnings projections may be affected by the evolution of technology 
available to rival producers, and technological progress (and regulatory actions) may affect 
ultimate demand. These possible shifts need to be incorporated into price projections, volume 
projections, and the modelling of how commodity price movements correlate with other 
variables of interest, such as global interest rates. Further, the technology risk implicitly 
refers to risks related to climate change.  
Transparency should be a guiding principle for the use of forecasting models. The main 
methodology for forecasting should be publicly available, as should model inputs. This 
ensures that forecasting results are replicable, that forecasting prevents the manipulation of 
data and modeling results, and that it enhances confidence in the execution of fiscal policy. 
 
  
                                                 
24 The Chilean Pension Reserve Fund receives a minimum contribution of 0.2 percent of previous year GDP, 
not only when there are fiscal surpluses. 
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Appendix II. Inflow and Outflow Rules of Selected Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
  Inflows Rule  Outflows Rule  
Australia: 
 
Pension Reserve 
Fund 
Contributions to the Future Fund 
and Nation-building Funds come from 
the Australian government's budget 
surpluses. The Future Fund has also 
received contributions resulting from the 
proceeds of the sale of the government’s 
stake in Telstra in late 2006 and 
approximately 2 billion shares in Telstra 
remaining after this sale process. Also, it 
received contributions from a combination 
of budget surpluses, proceeds from the 
sale of the government’s holding of 
Telstra and the transfer of remaining 
Telstra shares. The Finance Minister may 
have certain discretionary transfers from 
time to time. 
Withdrawals from the Fund occur only once 
the superannuation liability is fully offset or 
from July 1, 2020, whichever is the earlier, 
except for the purpose of meeting operating 
costs or unless the Future Fund’s balance 
exceeds the target asset level as defined by 
the Future Fund Act. They are determined 
by the government, subject to the advice of 
the relevant Advisory Board and oversight 
of the maximum spending from the funds by 
Parliament. 
The Board must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that, during a financial year, the 
amount of money standing to the credit of 
the Fund Account is sufficient to cover the 
purpose. 
The Fund Account is a Special Account for 
the purposes of the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997. 
Canada (Alberta): 
 
Savings Fund  
Initially: annual transfers of 30 percent of 
non-renewable resources. Until 1982, it 
retained all investment income. In 1984, it 
was reduced to 15 percent and to 0 percent 
in 1987.  
Since 1987: automatic annual payments 
apart from inflation-proofing to the Fund 
were stopped. From time to time, ad hoc 
capital was transferred to the fund 
primarily based on budget surpluses. The 
Fund has a legislated provision for 
retaining a portion of its income as 
protection against inflation. The annual 
amount forecast to be retained from 
investment income in the Fund for 
inflation-proofing is $304 million.  
ALM approach: Assets and income of the 
Heritage Fund are fully consolidated with 
the assets and revenue of the province. 
Initially all income was retained. 
Since 1982, the investment income earned 
by the Heritage Fund, less the amount 
retained in the fund for inflation proofing, is 
transferred to the province's main operating 
fund, the General Revenue Fund, to help pay 
for priority programs (essential to programs 
like health care and education) and keep 
taxes low. 
The Minister of Finance may charge a cost, 
expense, or other payment to the Heritage 
Fund if in the opinion of the Minister the 
cost, expense, or other payment was incurred 
or paid in respect of the Heritage Fund. 
 
Chile (ESSF): 
 
Stabilization Fund 
Effective fiscal surpluses above 
0.5 percent of GDP. 
To support counter-cyclical fiscal policies to 
complement fiscal revenue as needed and in 
order to finance authorized public 
expenditures in the case of a fiscal deficit, 
for the regular or extraordinary amortization 
of public debt, and for financing the annual 
contribution to the Pension Fund PRF. 
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  Inflows Rule  Outflows Rule  
New Zealand: 
 
Pension Reserve 
Fund 
The establishing legislation for the Fund 
includes a funding formula from which an 
annual government contribution is 
derived. Contributions are to be made 
during the early period of the Fund, while 
the cost of superannuation is relatively 
low, and invested by the Guardians to 
build the Fund. The contributions come 
from tax revenue.  
The contributions were suspended in 
July 2009 as the government prioritized 
debt reduction in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis. Under the funding 
formula, the calculated annual 
contributions in each period incorporate 
the Fund balance and therefore the 
expected future contributions reflect the 
contribution cessation, among other 
factors. The funding formula is disclosed: 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/
2001/0084/latest/DLM114296.html?searc
h=ts_act_New+Zealand+Superannuation+
and+Retirement+Income+Act+2001_resel 
 
After 2020, if the required annual capital 
contribution is less than 0, the Minister may 
require a capital withdrawal to be made from 
the Fund up to that amount and paid into a 
Crown Bank Account. 
At a certain point—currently from 
around 2035—the government will begin 
making withdrawals from the Fund in line 
with the funding formula to help smooth the 
cost of superannuation over time. 
Money may be paid out of the Fund to pay 
any fee that is payable to an investment 
manager or custodian in respect of the Fund, 
meet any other obligations that are directly 
related to the operation of the Fund, and pay 
the taxation liabilities arising in respect of 
the Fund. 
 
Norway:  
 
Stabilization and 
Savings Fund  
The inflows to the fund are defined in 
legislation and include the net cash flow 
to the government from the petroleum 
sector in addition to the returns on the 
fund’s investments.  
The net cash flow includes taxes and 
duties on petroleum companies as well as 
net cash flows from the government’s 
direct participation in the petroleum sector 
and dividends from Statoil. 
 
The outflow from the fund is a transfer to 
cover the non-oil deficit of the central 
government budget, defined as the difference 
between total expenditures and non-oil 
revenues.  
According to the so-called “spending rule,” 
the non-oil budget deficit should be on 
average 3 percent of the fund over time, 
which corresponds to the estimated real 
return on the Fund. The mechanism is 
detailed in Box 2. 
Kuwait (GRF and 
FGF):  
 
Stabilization and 
Savings Funds  
The GRF is the main treasurer for the 
government and receives all revenues 
(including all oil revenues) from which all 
State budgetary expenditures are paid.  
FGF (established in 1976 with 50 percent 
of the GRF balance): annual transfer of 
10 percent of all State revenues; all 
investment income is reinvested, 
including 10 percent of the net income of 
the GRF. 
GFR: transfers to pay the State budgetary 
expenditures sanctioned by law. 
FGF: No assets (withdrawals) can be 
withdrawn from the FGF unless authorized 
by specific legislation. 
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  Inflows Rule  Outflows Rule  
U.S. (Alaska):  
 
Savings Fund 
At least 25 percent of all mineral lease 
rentals, royalties, royalty sales proceeds, 
federal mineral revenue-sharing payments, 
and bonuses. 
The entire Fund is managed as a single 
investment pool. However, for accounting 
purposes it is divided into two parts: 
principal (the non-spendable funds) and the 
earnings reserve (assigned funds). The 
Alaska Constitution says that the principal 
may not be spent. The earnings in the 
earnings reserve may be spent by the 
Legislature for any public purpose, including 
the Permanent Fund Dividend distribution.  
The Legislature decides how Fund income is 
used. To date, the Legislature has: 
• inflation-proofed Fund principal,  
• paid dividends to qualified applicants,  
• made special appropriations to the 
principal, and paid for some Fund-
related state expenses  
 
Of the spending that has occurred from the 
Fund, most of it has been for dividends to 
qualified Alaska residents. 
UAE 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority 
The government of Abu Dhabi provides 
funds to the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) on periodic basis that 
are surplus to its budgetary requirements 
and other funding commitments. 
 
 
ADIA is required to make available to the 
government of Abu Dhabi, as needed, the 
financial resources to secure and maintain 
the future welfare of the Emirate. In practice, 
such withdrawals have occurred infrequently 
and usually during periods of extreme or 
prolonged weakness in commodity prices. 
 
In anticipating any withdrawals, ADIA 
manages its fund in such a way as to ensure 
there is a sufficient level of short-term 
liquidity to meet any anticipated funding 
requests from the government. 
 
ADIA is not involved with nor has any 
visibility on matters relating to the spending 
requirements of the government of the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
Timor-Leste: 
Petroleum Fund 
Income from upstream (and downstream) 
petroleum activities enters the Petroleum 
Fund, mainly from: (1) tax revenues, 
(2) first tranche petroleum and oil profit, 
(3) investment returns, and (4) other types 
of revenues such as pipeline rental. 
 
The Petroleum Fund’s only expenditure is a 
transfer to the central government budget 
(based on the Estimated Sustainable Income, 
calculated as 3 percent of total petroleum 
wealth), payment of operational 
management fees, and refunds of overpaid 
taxation. By the Petroleum Fund Law, the 
transfer to the State budget requires an 
explicit decision of Parliament. 
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  Inflows Rule  Outflows Rule  
Outflows are electronic transfers to the credit 
of a single State Budget account, as 
approved by Parliament for the Fiscal Year. 
 
No transfer from the Petroleum Fund in the 
Fiscal Year unless the government has first 
provided Parliament with reports: specifying 
the Estimated Sustainable Income for the 
Fiscal Year for which the transfer is made; 
specifying the Estimated Sustainable Income 
for the preceding Fiscal Year; and from the 
Independent Auditor certifying the amount 
of the Estimated Sustainable Income. 
 
Transfers from the Petroleum Fund by the 
Central Bank in the Fiscal Year take place 
after publication of the budget law. 
 
The Central Bank is entitled to deduct, by 
direct debit of the Petroleum Fund account, 
any reasonable management expenses, as 
provided for in the operational management 
agreement. 
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Appendix III. Considerations in Investment and Risk Management 
 
Investment Framework 
This section provides practical steps on further strengthening and developing SWFs’ 
investment and risk management, including the formulation of an investment strategy, the 
importance of explicitly adopting investment objectives and determining risk tolerance, and 
some guiding principles on risk management.  
The formulation of a strategy for investment management can be thought of as a hierarchy of 
decisions that start with the investment objective and end with the rationale for individual 
investment and divestment decisions. The basic principles of the chain of decisions, along 
with the responsible entity, are shown in the table below. 
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Table 2. Formulation of Investment Strategy 
Decision Rationale Entity 
Investment objective: the objective for 
investing the SWF funds, which will be derived 
from the purpose of the SWF. 
Establishing a basis for the 
management of the fund. 
Owner 
Risk and return expectations and risk 
tolerances: these will depend on the objective 
and purpose of the fund and the risk tolerance of 
the owner, and will take into account the 
liabilities of the SWF. 
Aiding transparency and consistency 
in investment decisions. 
Owner 
Investment beliefs: the nature of risk and return 
and the management of funds 
Ensuring transparency and consistency 
when making both asset allocation and 
investment/divestment decisions. 
Executive 
Board, or 
owner 
Strategic asset allocation (SAA): the target 
allocation to classes of assets, where the assets 
in each class are assumed to have broadly 
similar financial characteristics and to behave 
similarly in different market conditions. 
Combines the purpose and beliefs into 
a portfolio of assets that is expected to 
meet the objective of the fund. 
Executive 
Board, or 
owner 
Numeraire currency: the base currency of the 
portfolio, which should comprise a basket of 
currencies that best approximates the 
procurements that fund assets are expected to 
finance in the long run.  
Sets out the base by which to measure 
currency risk. 
Executive 
Board, or 
owner 
Investment constraints: some of these will 
result from the purpose of the fund, whereas 
others will result from risk tolerances. 
Sets out the maximum exposures that 
are appropriate to the purpose, 
objective, and risk tolerance. 
Executive 
Board 
Asset class performance benchmarks: these 
will set the return expectations at the asset class 
level. 
When the constituent asset classes of 
an SAA are assigned investable 
benchmarks with appropriate 
numeraire currency, the SAA 
represents a theoretical portfolio 
forming the benchmark against which 
the performance and risk of the fund 
are measured and managed. 
Executive 
Board 
Active risk budget and constraints: active risk 
is any deviation from benchmark weights, either 
for asset classes as a percentage of the fund 
(determined by the SAA) or for individual assets 
within an asset class as determined by the asset 
class benchmark. 
Sets out clearly where active risk is 
expected to be used in aggregate and 
at the investment opportunity level, 
which will be in line with the 
investment beliefs and any 
competitive advantages. 
Executive 
Board 
Statement of investment policies: a strategic 
document housing all of the investment policies 
of the SWF. 
Keeps all the investment policy 
statements in one place for regular 
review and high- level attention by the 
Executive Board.  
Executive 
Board 
Investment and divestment decisions: in 
accordance with the active risk budget and 
constraints and may involve the services of an 
external investment manager. 
Will include reference to policies 
regarding, inter alia, active risk and 
the selection and monitoring of 
external managers in order to maintain 
high-level attention on these issues. 
Investment 
managers 
Source: Authors. 
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The investment objective of an SWF is to maximize risk-adjusted returns subject to an 
appropriate level of risk for the investment horizon of the SWF. Stabilization funds, which 
are created to partially cover cyclical reductions in fiscal revenues, will have a relatively low 
risk-bearing capacity and an investment objective to maximize risk-adjusted returns, subject 
to maintaining overall low levels of risk and high levels of liquidity.25 On the other hand, 
savings funds have an ability to maintain investment exposures through market downturns 
and will typically have a greater portion of the fund in more volatile assets, such as equities, 
seeking to add return for this higher risk-bearing capacity.  
A statement of investment beliefs and principles helps to guide deliberations on strategic 
issues for the SWF. These statements are a means of (1) ensuring that investment decisions 
are consistent throughout an organization and its external managers and (2) facilitating 
comparisons of the attractiveness of various investment opportunities by allowing a 
comparison of the beliefs that need to be held in order to invest.  
An SAA is usually established early in the formulation of the investment strategy, and takes 
into account the liabilities of the SWF. Use of an SAA-based approach to investment strategy 
formulation rests on the belief that asset allocation is the key investment decision, a belief 
held by many institutional investors.26 According to this belief, the fund’s aggregate risk and 
return characteristics are driven mainly by its targeted mix of asset classes. In this approach, 
the SAA is chosen before selecting individual investments from within those asset classes. 
The SAA can be set by the fund owner or delegated to an operational manager, and it will 
reflect return and associated risk expectations. For instance, in Norway, the MoF determines 
and reviews the SAA and mandates the central bank to implement it. In other countries, such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore, the minister’s mandate is more generic, 
essentially delegating to the Board of the SWF the decision as to the appropriate SAA. 
The starting point could be a simpler, liquid, and passive equivalent of the typical SAA, 
called a reference portfolio. A typical SAA contains a target allocation to listed asset classes, 
such as bonds and equities, as well as to a number of unlisted investments, such as hedge 
funds and infrastructure. An alternative to the SAA-approach, used by the Canada Pension 
Plan Investment Board, NZ Super Fund, and GIC of Singapore, is a reference portfolio 
approach. Under this approach, the SWF owner sets a benchmark (the reference portfolio), 
which is comprised only of liquid and listed asset classes and an appropriate numeraire 
currency. The reference portfolio forms an implementable guide to the owner’s risk 
preference, while at the same time granting more discretion to the SWF manager to 
determine the appropriate mix of unlisted, less liquid assets.  
                                                 
25 Ideally, investment returns will be negatively correlated to fiscal revenues. 
26 Brinson et al. (1986), and Ibboston et al. (2000).  
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Explicit statements on risk tolerance aid consistency, transparency, and accountability.27 A 
risk appetite statement sets out more explicitly the tolerance for risk embodied in the choice 
of an SAA or reference portfolio. It includes both expectations that are on average through 
time, and tolerance through the shorter-term cycles. The expression of risk tolerance might 
be in terms of a stress loss or a drawdown limit, such as “the prospective losses from the fund 
shall not exceed x percent over a period of y years.” Risk appetite statements can also relate 
to non-investment risks (e.g., reputational risk). It also aids in consistency by making obvious 
any procyclical change in risk appetite as markets go through crises (where some investors 
tend to reduce their risk tolerance) and bubbles (where they tend to increase it).28  
The fund’s objective and the owner’s risk tolerance help determine what investment 
constraints are appropriate. For example, a stabilization fund might not be able to invest in 
domestic assets, or in any investment that is likely to go down in value at the same time that a 
withdrawal from the fund is required. Constraints can also include a limit to any single 
manager, asset, or opportunity in order to avoid any undue concentration.  
The choice of the numeraire currency is SWF specific. Various countries have arrived at 
different numeraire decisions based on the characteristics of their funds. The relevant 
yardstick for investments is the international purchasing power of the fund. Therefore, 
returns are usually measured in foreign currency terms. Some countries use one currency, 
often the United States dollar (Chile, Timor-Leste). Other countries (Norway, Singapore 
(GIC)) use a weighted basket of foreign currencies.29  
Benchmarks for each constituent asset class of the SAA should represent the full universe of 
assets that an investor could hold on a passive basis. The index should also, to the extent 
possible, be one that is constructed with objective selection criteria, and is complete, 
replicable, investable, and accepted by investors.  
Active risk budgets establish on average ex ante expectations of the amount of active risk 
that will be taken in a fund. A formal active risk budget seeks to optimize the expected extra 
return for the SWF by allocating more active risk discretion to managers (who are considered 
to be better at generating risk-adjusted returns), while controlling for the fund’s total 
deviation from the SAA. In most actively managed SWFs, the SAA risk (that is, the risk 
inherent in the benchmark) remains the majority of the total risk, with active risk contributing 
                                                 
27 Some SWFs, such as those in New Zealand and Singapore, specify the risk tolerance. The Chilean Social and 
Economic Stabilization Fund does not define a quantifiable risk tolerance level.   
28 Papaioannou et al. (2013), and Jones (2013, 2016).  
29 In the case of Norway, for instance, the real return on the fund is calculated as nominal return in foreign 
currency, adjusted for a weighted average of inflation in the countries that constitute the benchmark of the fund. 
Even if returns are measured in foreign currency, the accounts of SWFs are usually presented in local currency. 
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a much smaller amount.30 A clearly stated transition strategy should be used whenever there 
is a decision to adjust the SAA or the active risk budget.31 
A Statement of Investment Policies gives the appropriate strategic focus to the investment 
management of SWFs: 
• the classes of investment assets in which the fund is to be invested and the selection 
criteria for investment assets within those classes;  
• the determination of benchmarks or standards against which the performance of the 
fund as a whole and the classes of, and individual, investment assets will be assessed, 
including numeraire currency;  
• the balance between risk and return in the fund;  
• the constraints on investment of the fund, including the concentration risk limits;  
• the organizational structure for the investment and management of the fund, including 
the policies for the appointment and oversight of the external investment managers;  
• policies on voting rights on behalf of the owner; 
• the use of derivative financial instruments and leverage, including principles covering 
implicit leverage achieved through the use of derivatives and reinvestment of cash 
collateral provided in connection with securities lending or repurchase agreements; and 
• the management of credit, liquidity, operational, currency, market, and other risks.  
 
Risk Management 
It is difficult for an SWF to separate risk management from investment management, as risk 
is typically on the other side of the coin than return. Investment policies set out the SWF’s 
thinking about its investment strategy and management of investment risk, whereas the 
investment strategy sets out in which assets the portfolio is to be invested. Policy statements 
may be prescriptive (for example, “The fund will only use derivatives to hedge market risk”) 
or principles based (for example, “Executive Management will maintain a schedule setting 
out how derivatives are used in establishing active risk positions for each active risk 
strategy.”) Principles-based policy statements establish guidelines rather than prescribe the 
policy itself.  
A rebalancing policy should be designed to minimize rebalancing costs while controlling for 
deviation from the SAA. For simple portfolios, calendar-based rebalancing (for example, 
rebalancing at the end of every month) would be sufficient, but for more complex portfolios, 
risk-based rebalancing (for example, rebalancing when the risk of the portfolio exceeds a 
                                                 
30  Ang et al. (2009).  
31 There are many examples of a staged transition to riskier assets, including the Norwegian SWF, which moved 
from a bond portfolio into 40 percent equities after two years, but then took a further 20 years to move into real 
estate. The New Zealand SWF moved immediately into the desired portfolio of effectively 80 percent equities, 
but took a number of years to increase in stages its exposure to active risk strategies including illiquidity.    
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specified limit) would allow for the movements in the various asset classes to offset each 
other in risk terms.  
In its broadest sense, risk for an SWF is the potential to not achieve the fund’s objectives. 
Risks include financial risks (e.g., market risk, currency risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk), 
and also operational risk (error, fraud), strategic risk (governance risk, agency risk, the risk of 
poor organizational design), and regulatory risk.  
There are some risks that are not compensated with return, and these risks should be 
managed with a view to balancing risk against risk mitigation cost. Elimination of risk is not 
always possible, because many risks (for example, operational and agency risks) are 
unavoidable in the implementation of the investment strategy. In some instances, elimination 
or mitigation is not desirable due to a judgment that the risk mitigation cost is too high when 
compared to the implications of the risk that is to be mitigated.  
A risk analytics team or external providers can help SWFs to ensure a full understanding of 
the fund’s market risk(s). Estimates of the risks inherent in the fund’s SAA and active 
management program lead to a better understanding of the fund’s potential vulnerabilities. 
Examples of risks typically analyzed include asset volatility, correlation across asset classes 
and sub-asset classes, sensitivity to macroeconomic variables, contribution from non-
numeraire currency exposures, susceptibility to liquidity events, and downside risk due to 
diverse market distress scenarios.  
Risk policies should clearly set out both the approach to risk management and the risk 
parameters, as well as the timetable for review of both the approach and the parameters. A 
fund with a stable investment horizon and a dynamic asset allocation program, that allows 
them to react to changed market conditions in real time, might review the SAA every three 
years. A review period of one year is more appropriate for a fund that is less mature or that 
does not engage in dynamic asset allocation. Events that trigger a review include a change in 
investment objective or a change in investment horizon.  
The use of derivatives is an integral part of investment management. Derivatives are often 
used to reduce risk by hedging components of an investment (e.g., credit risk) that do not suit 
the mix of other assets in a portfolio, the fund purpose, or the risk appetite of the owner. 
Derivatives can also be used to obtain exposure to global equities or bonds in a cost-efficient 
manner and they can be used to implement active risk taking. The use of derivatives can be 
complex and can create unintended credit, currency, liquidity, and leverage exposures, in turn 
creating reputational risk and the risk of significant financial losses. These characteristics call 
for much higher controls, than for other investments, on derivative use and monitoring of any 
associated leverage, credit, liquidity, currency, and market risk implications.  
